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Abstract
According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communica-
tion can be an effective tool to increase trust and enhance cooperation. This paper
focuses on reasons why people stick to a given promise and analyzes to what extent
image concerns of being perceived as a promise breaker play a role. In a controlled
laboratory experiment, we vary the ex post observability of the promising party’s
action in order to test for social image concerns. We observe that slightly more
promises are kept if the action is revealed than if it is not, yet the difference is
not significant. However, a variation in the selection of pre-defined messages across
treatments delivers another interesting finding. While most of the promises are
kept, statements of intent tend to be broken.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation among interacting partners is essential for economic success in many situ-
ations, as joint value creation often exceeds individual achievements. These situations
become challenging as soon as cooperation cannot be contractually enforced, but relies
on mutual trust by the interacting partners. Among a large literature focusing on how
to improve cooperation, various experimental studies show that communication can be
an effective tool to enhance it (see, e.g. Bochet and Putterman, 2009; Cooper et al.,
1992; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). While several articles analyze whether cheap
talk can be effective and how this depends on the communication protocol and the game
structure (see for instance Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Camera et. al., 2011; Ellingsen
and O¨stling, 2010; Kriss et al., 2011; Mohlin and Johanneson, 2008), we contribute to
the literature focusing on why individuals stick to a commitment, given that rationality
predicts a deviating behavior. In particular, we analyze whether and to what extent
social image concerns motivate people to stick to a given promise. More precisely, as
breaking a promise is deemed negative in society, avoiding the image of being a promise
breaker might induce individuals to keep their word. Consequently, we study whether an
individual is more likely to act in line with a given promise if its violation is more obvious
to its receiver.
In order to test whether social image concerns influence promise keeping behavior, we
conduct a controlled laboratory experiment. Here, subjects are randomly matched in
pairs of two and play a one-shot sequential trust game similar to the one used in Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006). A first mover (A) decides whether to enter the game or to opt
out, the latter choice inducing a low outside option for both players. If A enters the
game, a second mover (B) chooses between a selfish option, yielding a payoff of zero for
A, and cooperation, in which case a chance move determines whether A gets a positive
payoff or 0.1 Prior to the strategic decisions, the second mover sends one out of three
pre-defined messages to the first mover, one of which is a promise to cooperate. In order
to test for social image concerns, we vary the ex-post observability of the second mover’s
action. While in condition Rev A learns B’s action choice, in condition NoRev she cannot
infer whether a payoff of zero is due to B behaving selfish or just to bad luck.2 We
hypothesize that a higher share of Bs cooperate if B’s action is revealed to A (Rev) than
if it is concealed (NoRev), assuming that a fraction of Bs has a preference for avoiding
the image of being a promise breaker.
By the choice of our experimental design, we attempt to differentiate social image con-
1While rational behavior predicts the second mover to behave selfish, and therefore the first mover
not to enter the game, mutual cooperation is the unique Pareto-optimal outcome, which generates the
highest joint payoff.
2Conditions are assigned randomly to pairs.
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cerns from other possible reasons for promise keeping by second movers. Up to now, the
literature mainly provides two motivations why individuals might stick to their promises.
Firstly, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) explain promise keeping by simple guilt, i.e. the
aversion to disappoint other people’s expectations, as introduced by Batigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2007). If the second mover promises cooperation, the first mover expects a higher
payoff, which increases the second mover’s guilt in case he refuses to cooperate. However,
in our experiment only the game structure and the payoffs are common knowledge, but Bs
are privately informed about the revelation condition. As are not even aware that different
conditions exist. Thus, As’ first order beliefs, and consequently Bs’ second-order beliefs
should not vary across conditions, inducing the same amount of guilt for non-cooperation
in both conditions.3 Secondly, Vanberg (2008) claims that subjects have a preference
for keeping their promises per se, independent of others’ expectations. This assumption
cannot explain a difference in Bs’ behavior across conditions either, as the preference for
keeping a promise should be independent of A’s ex-post information.
Yet, as the revelation of B’s action choice might also induce a concern of being perceived as
selfish (Tadelis, 2011), we conduct a control treatment without communication (NoCom).
We claim that the effect of revelation on behavior in treatment Com is larger than the
respective effect in NoCom, indicating that the differential effect is due to the mere
aversion of being perceived as a promise breaker, additional to the aversion to an egoistic
image.
With pre-play communication, we observe marginally significantly more cooperation in
Rev than in NoRev. This effect does not seem to be driven by shame to be selfish
alone, as without communication revelation even marginally decreases cooperation rates
in Rev compared to NoRev. However, although conditions are identical at the pre-play
communication stage, the number of promises sent is significantly higher in Rev than
in NoRev. Thus, the higher Roll rate in Rev might only be driven by a higher number
of promises and not by image concerns of being perceived as a promise breaker. When
comparing the share of promises kept, we do observe a slightly higher rate in Rev (85%)
than in NoRev (81%), however the difference is not significant. Thus, we fail to prove
our hypothesis that avoiding the image of being perceived as a promise breaker plays a
significant role in the individual decision to keep a given promise.
It is worth noting that the high promise keeping rate without revelation (81%) limits the
scope for further increase. In treatment Com1, where Bs can choose between a promise
to cooperate, a statement of intent, and an empty message, this high promise keeping
rate might be partly due to the fact that Bs, who attempt to influence their interaction
partner without planning to cooperate, have the possibility to send a statement of intent.
3Otherwise A might expect B to choose Roll with a higher probability if his choice is revealed, inducing
higher simple guilt in Rev than in NoRev (if we assume consistent beliefs).
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In order to reduce the promise keeping rate without revelation by forcing this type of
subjects to either break a promise or refrain from influencing the interaction partner, we
exclude the opportunity of stating an intention in a further treatment, Com2. However,
we do not observe a significant effect of revelation in Com2 either.
Still, this design variation provides another interesting finding. The menu of messages
available to B seems to play a significant role for the effectiveness of communication, as
Bs are significantly more likely to keep a promise than to stick to a statement of intent.
Hence, intentions seem to be less costly to break than promises. In contrast, As, who
are unaware of the available messages, seem to trust intentions to the same amount as
promises.
Literature
This paper is mainly related to two strands of the economic literature. First, there is
an expanding literature analyzing the effect of non-binding communication on behavior.
Experimental studies show that communication can increase coordination (Blume and
Ortmann, 2007; Ellingsen and O¨stling, 2010; Kriss et al., 2011), generosity in a dictator
game (Andreoni and Rao, 2011; Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008), and most relevant for
our study, cooperation (Bochet and Putterman, 2009; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006,
2010; Cooper et al., 1992; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008). So far,
mainly two reasons for the effectiveness of communication have been identified. On the
one hand, guilt aversion in the sense of Batigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) has been found to
induce promise keeping (see for instance, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, or Beck et al.,
2013).4 On the other hand, individuals can exhibit a preference for promise keeping per
se, that is, promises have a commitment value (Ismayilov and Potters, 2012; Vanberg,
2008). Likewise, individuals might face costs of lying (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi,
2013; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al., 2009; Mazar et al., 2008). However,
none of these papers consider social image concerns as a reason why people stick to their
promises.
A second related strand in the behavioral economics literature studies the effect of social
image concerns on behavior. Following Ariely et al. (2009), “image motivation [. . . ]
refers to an individual’s tendency to be motivated partly by others’ perceptions.” That
is, individuals dislike to publicly violate a social norm, such as altruism or modesty. Cor-
respondingly, evidence for individuals behaving more selfishly or greedily if their action
is less likely to be observed, has for example been found in experimental dictator games
(Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Broberg et al 2007; Dana et al., 2006; Dana et al., 2007;
Grossman, 2010a, 2010b; Koch and Normann, 2008; Larson and Capra, 2009) and in the
context of volunteering (e.g. Carpenter and Myers, 2010; Linardi and McConnell, 2008)
4However, the effect of guilt aversion has been found to be relatively small (Ellingsen et al., 2010).
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or donations (Ariely et al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Lacetera and Macis, 2010).
Similar to our experimental design, Tadelis (2011) builds on the framework of CD (2006)
and varies the ex post information of the first mover. He shows that image concerns to
appear selfish (the “shame” effect) exist and increase cooperation, especially if anonymity
is lifted, by announcing the second mover’s action choice to all participants in the room.
However, subjects in his setting are not able to communicate.
In our study, we combine these two strands of literature and investigate whether social
image concerns are even more pronounced with communication, due to the aversion of
being perceived as a promise breaker. Bracht and Regner (2011) also analyze social
image concerns in a similar trust game with communication, however, they focus on
the correlation of behavior to proneness to shame and guilt, which they elicit via a
psychological test.5 While Bracht and Regner (2011) analyze the effect of transparency
and communication separately, we focus on how communication interacts with the effect
of revelation on behavior. To the best of our knowledge, social image concerns have rarely
been analyzed in the context of communication.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the exper-
imental design and the leading Hypotheses. In Section 3, we analyze and discuss the
experimental results. We compare our results to previous research in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
2.1 Experimental Design
At the beginning of the experiment, role A is assigned to half of the subjects while the
other half is assigned role B. One subject with role A and one subject with role B are
randomly matched to form a pair.6 Each pair subsequently plays the one-shot trust
game depicted in Figure 1, which is akin to the one used by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), henceforth CD (2006). The upper number refers to A’s payoff, the lower one to
B’s.7
A (“she”) decides whether to enter the game (In) or not (Out). Without learning A’s
decision, B (“he”) decides whether to keep a payoff of 30 tokens for himself while A
5Bracht and Regner (2011) find that disposition to guilt predicts behavior, but not disposition to
shame.
6In the following, we refer to the player with role A (B) as A (B).
7In comparison to CD (2006), stakes are lower in our set-up, as one session consists of two separate
experiments, which are both paid out (see Section 2.3). However, the proportions of the payoffs resulting
from different strategies are similar.
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receives nothing (Don’t Roll), or to let a die decide over A’s payoff (Roll). In this case,
A receives a payoff of 24 tokens with probability 5
6
and a payoff of 0 with probability 1
6
,
while B earns a payoff of 20 tokens in any case. In order to elicit B’s action choice we
use the strategy method, i.e. B decides on his action independent of whether A enters the
game or not. At the end of the experiment, one token is converted into 0.25 Euros.
Figure 1: The Trust Game
A	  
B	  
Out	   In	  
Don’t	   Roll	  
Chance	  
⅙	   ⅚	  
10	  
10	  
0	  
30	  
0	  
20	  
24	  
20	  
We conduct three treatments, called Com1, Com2 and NoCom. In Com1 and Com2 B
sends one out of three predefined messages to A, prior to playing the trust game. Com1
and Com2 differ only in the type of messages that can be sent. In Com1 B can choose
between a promise (“I promise to choose Roll.”), an intention (“I will choose Roll.”) or
an empty message (“Hello, how are you? I’m fine.”). In Com2 B can choose between
the same promise and two empty messages (“Hello!” and “How are you?”), i.e. B cannot
send an intention in Com2. As the design of Com1 and Com2 is the same except for the
message choices, we sometimes refer to the pooling of both communication treatments as
Com. NoCom is a control treatment, which is identical to the other two treatments, but
without pre-play communication.
Without any further information, A cannot infer whether B has chosen Roll or Don’t Roll
whenever she experiences a payoff of 0. However, we are interested in the influence of
social image concerns on B’s cooperative behavior (see Section 2.2), that is, whether B
cares about how he is perceived by A. Consequently, we vary whether A can observe B’s
action choice at the end of the experiment or not, which yields two conditions within
each treatment. Before playing the trust game, half of the pairs is randomly assigned to
condition “Revelation” (Rev), the other half plays condition “No Revelation” (NoRev).
In condition Rev B’s choice will be revealed to A at the end of the experiment, whereas A
does not learn B’s behavior in condition NoRev.
B is informed about the condition he plays before choosing between Roll and Don’t Roll,
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but after having sent a message to A. Thereby, we ensure that only the action choice,
and not the type of message sent, is affected by the condition. In other words, when B
chooses the message to be sent, both conditions are exactly equal and Bs’ communication
behavior should not differ across conditions. Hence, any difference in Roll rates across
conditions is then due to the variation of the observability of B’s action choice and not to
a difference in messages across conditions. Figure 2 provides an overview of the course
of the experiment.
Figure 2: The Sequence of the Experiment
[Communication] 
As choose In or Out 
Bs choose Roll  
or Don‘t Roll 
Elicitation  
of beliefs 
Bs learn their condition  
and that As do not know 
that two conditions exist 
Payoff information 
In condition Rev: 
As learn the strategy  
of their partner 
A neither learns the condition she is playing in nor is she aware that two different con-
ditions exist until the end of the experiment. The instructions are the same for A and B
and inform the participants only about the course and the payoffs of the game, without
commenting on information structures.8 B receives private information about the condi-
tion he plays via his screen during the experiment. By not informing A, we ensure that
A’s first-order belief about B’s behavior is constant across conditions. Furthermore, B is
explicitly informed about A’s unawareness that two conditions exist, thus his second-order
belief about A’s expectations should not vary across conditions. Therefore, guilt aversion,
i.e. the aversion to disappoint A’s expectations cannot cause a difference in B’s behavior
across conditions. We explain the concept of guilt aversion in more detail in Section 2.2.
A’s first-order and B’s second-order beliefs are elicited after the trust game, but before
subjects learn their payoffs. As were asked: “What do you think, how many of the x Bs
in the room have chosen Roll?”, where x was substituted by the number of Bs in the
session. For Bs, eliciting beliefs is a bit more involved. In a sequential game like the
one we consider, B’s choice only becomes relevant for those As who choose In, thus only
the first-order beliefs of those As should matter for B’s behavior and his second-order
belief. Hence, we asked all Bs: “We asked all As: “What do you think, how many of the
x Bs in the room have chosen Roll?” Consider only the As who chose In. What do you
think is the average guess of those As?”9 Subjects earn a supplement of 6 tokens for a
8However, the instructions emphasize that all Bs throw a die such that Bs’ decisions can not be
inferred, which is likely to induce a prior of getting no information among As.
9This procedure is analogous to the one in CD (2006).
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guess deviating by at most +/-1 from the correct answer. This way, we elicit an interim
second-order belief conditional on the event of A choosing In.10
2.2 Hypotheses
In the following, we derive our hypotheses from a notion of social image concerns and
subsequently exclude other possible behavioral explanations for our hypotheses.
Assuming selfish and risk-neutral players, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
trust game illustrated in Figure 1 is (Out, Don’t Roll). However, while the classical game
theory claims that non-binding communication cannot influence the players’ strategies
if information is symmetric, it has been observed in the laboratory that communication
indeed enhances cooperation in trust games – promises are made, taken as credible and
frequently kept. While CD (2006) argue that subjects keep their promises due to guilt
aversion, that is, to not disappoint the increased expectations of the truster, Vanberg
(2008) claims that people have a tendency to keep their promise per se, independent of
the truster’s expectations. Still, in their experiments a considerable share of trustees
break a given promise.11 We analyze whether a change in the set-up, i.e. introducing
transparency about the trustee’s action induces more trustees to be true on their word.
More precisely, we investigate whether social image concerns of being perceived as a
promise breaker exist and induce individuals to stick to their word. This yields our main
hypothesis, which we break down to testable hypotheses in the following.
Main Hypothesis. The aversion of being perceived as a promise breaker exists and is
one reason for why people keep a given promise.
Indeed, it is frequently observed by Economists, Sociologists and Psychologists that peo-
ple care for how they are perceived by others (e.g. Apsler, 1975; Grossman, 2010a;
Lacetera and Macis, 2010; Lewis, 1995; Scheff, 1988; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, 1995).
Applied to our setting, we hypothesize that the trustee is more likely to cooperate if his
action choice is revealed than if it is concealed, in a situation where communication is
possible.12
Hypothesis 1. The revelation of Bs’ action choices induces more cooperation among Bs.
In our setting, the Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is higher than in [Com|NoRev].
10One could argue that observing the actual choice of the A-player is far more influential for beliefs
than a hypothetical choice. However, we think that this effect is negligible given that the results show a
high correlation between second-order beliefs and actual strategy choices.
11CD (2006) observe that 25% of promisers break their promise without revelation, Vanberg 2008
observes a share of 27% (no switch condition).
12We are aware that the experimenter always observes whether a promise is kept or not and that this
can also evoke some social image concerns. However, the presence of the experimenter does not vary
across conditions.
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However, the presence of social image concerns does not necessarily rely on the possibility
to communicate. In fact, even without communication evidence for social image concerns
has been found, such as the aversion of being perceived as egoistic or greedy (e.g. Ariely et
al., 2009; Dana et al., 2006, 2007; Gu¨th et al., 1996; Koch and Normann, 2008; Tadelis,
2011). From a theoretical point of view, Tadelis (2011) proposes a model of “shame”
inducing disutility of being perceived as a non-cooperator, in order to explain the effect
he observes.13 Besides the social disapproval of egoism, we are interested in the existence
of another social norm which condemns promise breaking, thereby inducing additional
social image concerns. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the effect of revelation on Roll
rates is larger if subjects can communicate than without communication, indicating that
the differential effect has to be due to an aversion to be regarded as a promise breaker.
Hence, we compare the results of Com to the control treatment NoCom and state the
following hypothesis.14
Hypothesis 2. The effect of revelation on cooperation is larger if pre-play communication
takes place. In our setting, the difference between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev] is larger
than the difference between [NoCom|Rev] and [NoCom|NoRev].
Yet, communication might enhance cooperative behavior of Bs independent of the ob-
servability of Bs’ action choice (CD, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). In order to contribute the
hypothesized higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] compared to [Com|NoRev] to revelation
only, the share of promises has to be equal in both conditions. Given that Bs do not
know the condition they play at the pre-play communication stage, and Bs are randomly
assigned to both conditions, promising behavior should not differ across conditions. Still,
if and only if this holds, we can conclude our main hypothesis from Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Elimination of Alternative Explanations
In the following, we show that, given Hypothesis 1 holds, it can neither be explained by
simple guilt nor by promise-keeping per se.
Simple guilt. If B is subject to simple guilt, in the sense of Batigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007), he is reluctant to cause a lower payoff for A compared to what he believes she
expects to earn. Let thus αA := PrA(Roll) denote A’s belief about the probability that
B cooperates. Then A expects to earn a payoff of 5
6
· αA · 24 = 20αA upon entering the
game. In turn, B forms a belief about A’s belief about his action choice, given that A
chooses In. This results in B’s interim second-order belief βB := E[αA|In]. By choosing
13“Guilt from blame” (Batigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) also accounts for more cooperation in the Rev
condition, based on B facing disutility from A blaming him for a bad outcome.
14We consider the Roll rates of all trustees in Com rather than focusing on those of the promising
trustees only, as this allows for a comparison of Roll rates to the behavior in the control treatment,
NoCom.
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Don’t Roll conditional on A choosing In, B experiences simple guilt proportional to 20βB,
his belief about the difference between A’s payoff expectation and her experienced payoff.
In contrast, if B cooperates, any deception by A cannot be due to B’s behavior, thus he
doesn’t feel guilty. Assuming that B’s utility is additively separable in his material payoff
and his experienced simple guilt, this yields
uB(In,Roll) = 20
uB(In,Don
′tRoll) = 30− θSG · 20βB,
where θSG denotes B’s sensitivity to simple guilt.
Simple guilt can explain why communication is able to influence behavior. If B makes
a promise, he believes that he influences A’s belief about his behavior, i.e. βB increases.
Ceteris paribus, this induces a lower payoff for choosing Don’t Roll, hence a larger share
of Bs chooses Roll after having sent a promise.
While simple guilt delivers an explanation for why communication fosters cooperation,
it cannot explain the effect in Hypothesis 1. As As do not learn the condition they play,
their first-order beliefs cannot depend on whether Bs’ behavior is revealed or not. Bs know
about the unawareness among As and thus their second-order beliefs cannot depend on
the condition either. Thus, ceteris paribus, guilt aversion predicts the same Roll rates
for conditions Rev and NoRev. As the condition is not known to both players at the
time communication takes place, the amount of promises should be the same in both
conditions. Given this assumption, guilt aversion predicts the same Roll rates whether
B’s decision is revealed or not, which contradicts Hypothesis 1.
Self-image concerns (“Promise keeping per se”). Vanberg (2008) argues that there
exists a preference for promise keeping per se independent of the truster’s expectations.
He shows that in case an individual faces a different player than the one he made a
promise to, his action choice does not depend on whether the new partner has received
a promise by another player before or not. In a similar vein, Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) introduce the notion of “lying cost”. They propose a model where inequity averse
players suffer from a fixed personal cost of being inconsistent, l ≥ 0, which in turn leads
to a higher commitment power and credibility of promises.
However, whether B’s action in the trust game is revealed to A in the end or not does not
make a difference to B if he is a “promise-keeper per se”. Thus, given an equal number of
promises in both conditions, Hypothesis 1 can not be solely induced by promise-keeping
per se.
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2.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic
and Social Sciences (MELESSA). Subjects were recruited using the online recruitment
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the 406 participants in 17 sessions consisted mainly
of students. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to 24 visually
isolated computer terminals. The instructions were distributed and read out loud by
one of the experimenters. Questions were answered individually at the subjects’ seats.
Before the experiment started, subjects filled out a short questionnaire ensuring the
comprehension of the rules.
The experiment was the first of two independent experiments conducted in one session.
Before the experiment started, participants were informed that two independent experi-
ments would be conducted without any further information about the second experiment.
Both experiment were paid out at the end of the session, where the average earning was
12.6 EUR, including a fixed show-up fee of 4 EUR. In the first experiment, As received
3.5 EUR on average, while the mean among Bs was 5.2 EUR. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session ended
with a detailed questionnaire on demographics and social preferences and lasted about
50 minutes.
3 Experimental Results
In this section we first analyze the effect of revelation on Bs’ behavior (Section 3.1),
followed by an investigation of the effects of communication (Section 3.2).
3.1 The Effect of Revelation on Bs’ Behavior
In the following, we pool the data of Com1 and Com2 to Com in order to analyze the
differences between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev]. This procedure is justified as the effect
of revelation on Bs’ behavior does not differ between the two communication treatments.
Data considering each treatment separately is gathered in the appendix.
Our first result provides some evidence for Hypothesis 1.
Result 1. The Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is higher than in [Com|NoRev], with the difference
being marginally significant.
Indeed, while 63% of Bs choose Roll in [Com|Rev], this share amounts to only 51% in
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[Com|NoRev] (test of proportions, one-tailed, Z=1.450, p=0.074).15 Thus, Hypothesis 1
is confirmed on a marginally significant level, indicating that subjects in a situation where
communication is possible behave more cooperatively when their action is revealed than
when it is not.
The next step is to take a closer look at the source of this marginally significant effect.
We claim that Bs behave more cooperatively in [Com|Rev] than in [Com|NoRev] as they
do not want to be perceived as a promise breaker. In order to confirm this claim, we have
to confirm that the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] is not only caused by an image concern
of being perceived as selfish, but rather induced by the combination of communication
and revelation (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, we compare the observed effect of revelation
in Com to the one in NoCom. Figure 3 illustrates the shares of Bs choosing Roll in Com
and NoCom separated by condition.
Figure 3: Roll Rates of Bs Separated by Condition
63%	  
37%	  
51%	  
53%	  
0%	  
10%	  
20%	  
30%	  
40%	  
50%	  
60%	  
70%	  
Com	   NoCom	  
Rev	  
NoRev	  
First, we consider the NoCom treatment separately and find no evidence for an image
concern of being perceived as selfish.
Result 2. The Roll rate in [NoCom|Rev] is marginally significantly lower than the one
in [NoCom|NoRev]. Hence, there is no evidence for the existence of image concerns of
being perceived as selfish.
15If we consider Com1 and Com2 separately, the effect goes in the same direction, but is no longer
significant (Com1 : 54% vs. 42%, Z=1.062, p=0.144; Com2 : 72% vs. 61%, Z=1.000, p=0.159, one-tailed
test). Throughout this paper, the Z-Statistics reflect the test of proportions (see Glasnapp and Poggio,
1985) and p-values are on one-tailed tests, because we use our underlying hypotheses, except when
reported otherwise.
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Indeed, only 37% of Bs choose Roll in [NoCom|Rev] whereas 53% cooperate in [NoCom|NoRev].
This difference is marginally significant (test of proportions, one-tailed, Z=1.292, p=0.098).
Thus, if revelation changes Bs’ behavior in NoCom, it rather decreases cooperative be-
havior.16 This rather unexpected result is unlikely to be a demand effect as Bs are only
informed about their own condition, i.e. that their behavior is revealed or not revealed to
A, but not about the existence of the other condition. The low Roll rate in [NoCom|Rev]
might be a sullen behavior due to the sudden announcement that B’s action will be
revealed to A, which was not mentioned in the instructions.
While Result 1 and Result 2 already suggest the confirmation of Hypothesis 2, i.e. that
the effect of revelation on cooperation is larger in Com than in NoCom, we conduct
a probit regression to compare the differences across conditions in Com and NoCom,
delivering the following result (Hypothesis 2).
Result 3. The difference in Roll rates between [Com|Rev] and [Com|NoRev] is signifi-
cantly larger than the one between [NoCom|Rev] and [NoCom|NoRev]. Hence, Hypoth-
esis 2 is confirmed.
The results of the probit regression are reported in Table 1. The dependent variable is 1
if B chooses Roll and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are a dummy for Com, a
dummy for Rev, and an interaction of the two.
Table 1: Regression of Choosing Roll
PROBIT OLS
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
Com -0.049 -0.019
(0.770) (0.775)
Rev -0.424 -0.167
(0.105) (0.108)
Com*Rev 0.731 0.287
(0.030) (0.040)
Constant 0.084 0.533
(0.279) (0.000)
We cluster standard errors on sessions (17 sessions). Number of observations is 203. In the Probit
regression Pseudo R-squared is 0.023 and log Pseudo Likelihood is -136.961. In the OLS regression
R-squared is 0.031.
We observe that the only significant coefficient is the one of the interaction term Com*Rev
(p=0.030), which is positive, showing that cooperation among Bs is increased by revelation
only in treatment Com. The negative and almost marginally significant coefficient of
16This result is in contrast to Tadelis (2011).
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Rev indicates the negative effect of revelation on cooperation without communication.
The results are robust to an OLS regression, which is also reported in Table 1. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.
Yet, it remains to show that Bs’ communication behavior does not differ between [Com|Rev]
and [Com|NoRev]. For no apparent reason, we are not able to confirm this.
Result 4. The share of promises among messages in [Com|Rev] is significantly higher
than the one in [Com|NoRev]. Hence, we are not able to conclude the main hypothesis
about the existence of an image concern of being perceived as a promise breaker.
Table 2 provides an overview of the messages sent from B to A in Com.
Table 2: Overview of Messages Sent in Com
Promise Intention Empty
Com
Rev
48/71 6/71 17/71
68% 9% 24%
NoRev
37/72 13/72 22/72
51% 18% 31%
Z stat. 1.975 -1.692 0.888
(p-value) (0.024) (0.045) (0.187)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
There is neither a difference in the design nor in the instructions of the two conditions. B
does not even know that two different conditions exist when sending his message. Still,
we observe a significantly higher share of Bs sending a promise in [Com|Rev] than in
[Com|NoRev] (68% vs. 51%, one-tailed test of proportions, Z=1.975, p=0.024).17 On the
other hand, we also observe a significantly smaller share of intentions in [Com|Rev] than
in [Com|NoRev] (Z=1.692, p=0.045), yielding a similar share of intentions and promises
(pooled) in both conditions (76% in [Com|Rev] vs. 70% in [Com|NoRev], p=0.448, two-
tailed test). However, as further analyzed in Section 3.2 and reported in Table 3, subjects
sending a promise choose Roll significantly more often than subjects sending an intention
or an empty message (in Rev Z=5.568, p=0.000, in NoRev Z=5.183, p=0.000). Thus,
we cannot pool intentions and promises, and the communication behavior has to be
considered as largely different in both conditions, indicated by a significantly higher
share of promises in Rev than in NoRev.
Therefore, we cannot confirm our main hypothesis via Hypotheses 1 and 2. In order
to further investigate what drives the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] in comparison to
17This difference is not driven by one or two sessions, but occurs in all sessions of both communication
treatments. It is only marginally significant if we consider Com1 and Com2 separately (see the appendix).
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[Com|NoRev], we examine the behavior of subjects sending a promise separately and
compare it between conditions, thereby accounting for the different number of promises.
If the combination of revelation and communication drives the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev],
the share of promise keepers should be higher in condition [Com|Rev] than in [Com|NoRev].
As shown in Result 2, revelation itself does not lead to a higher Roll rate in comparison
to no revelation, hence image concerns of being perceived as selfish play a negligible role
in our setting. This allows us to conduct a separate analysis on the set of Bs sending a
promise and attribute a difference in Roll rates among promising Bs across conditions to
the image concern of being perceived as a promise breaker.18
Result 5. The share of Bs keeping their promise among Bs who give a promise is slightly
higher in [Com|Rev] than in [Com|NoRev], however the difference is not significant.
From Result 5 we conclude that the higher Roll rate in [Com|Rev] in comparison to
[Com|NoRev] is mostly driven by the higher number of promises, and not by social
image concerns of being perceived as a promise breaker. Table 3 reports the Roll rates
for each type of message sent in both conditions.
Table 3: Roll Rates by Type of Message Sent in Com
Promise Intention Empty
Com
Rev
41/48 1/6 3/17
85% 17% 18%
NoRev
30/37 4/13 3/22
81% 31% 14%
Z stat. 0.534 -0.650 0.344
(p-value) (0.270) (0.258) (0.365)
The Z Stat reflects the test of proportions for the two treatments or conditions (see Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
In NoRev already 81% of promising Bs stick to their word, which leaves little scope for
further increase by revelation. Still, in Rev the share is even higher with 85%. Although
the effect goes in the predicted direction, the difference is not large enough to be significant
(Z=0.534, p=0.270).
Result 5 is further supported by probit regressions of the decision to choose Roll, which are
reported in Table 4. Here, we categorize messages into promises and no promises, where
we categorize intentions as “no promise”, as Bs’ behavior after having sent an intention
is not significantly different from the behavior after having sent an empty message (see
Table 3 and Section 3.2). Column 1 of Table 4 reports the results of Com, Column 2 of
18If there was a higher Roll rate in [NoCom|Rev] than in [NoCom|NoRev], this analysis would not
be meaningful since we cannot compare the effect of revelation among Bs sending a promise in Com to
the overall effect in NoCom. Therefore, we started off with considering overall Roll rates in Com.
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NoCom and Column 3 (4) reports the results of a regression including both treatments
with (without) controls.19
Table 4: Probit of Bs Decision to Choose Roll
Coefficient (p-value)
Com NoCom All All
Promise 1.742 0.808 0.715
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rev -0.059 -0.322 -0.382 -0.424
(0.846) (0.157) (0.142) (0.105)
Promise∗Rev 0.216 0.527 0.623
(0.561) (0.158) (0.085)
NoPromise -0.639 -0.535
(0.116) (0.233)
NoPromise∗Rev -0.264 -0.347
(0.464) (0.346)
Risk 0.097 0.205 0.132
(0.064) (0.039) (0.003)
Female 0.486 -0.235 0.259
(0.022) (0.339) (0.150)
# of observations 131 60 191 191
# of sessions 11 5 16 16
Pseudo R-squared 0.314 0.106 0.240 0.212
Log Pseudo Likelihood -61.519 -36.908 -100.433 -104.052
The regressions cluster on sessions. The reference category is NoRev, or [NoCom|NoRev] respectively.
The sample consists of all Bs in all sessions, except of one session of Com2, which we exclude due to a
lack of controls. Results (in column 4) do not change if we include the session. Results for Com and
NoCom (columns 1 and 2) do not change when excluding the controls.
In all 4 regressions the dependent variable is B’s decision, represented by a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if B chooses Roll and 0 otherwise. Promise (NoPromise) is a
dummy variable for sending a (no) promise in Com, Rev is a dummy for the condition
Rev, and Promise*Rev (NoPromise*Rev) is an interaction dummy of the two. In Column
1-3, we also include two controls, a measurement of risk and a female dummy.20
We observe that the probability to choose Roll is significantly higher if B sends a promise
19Due to a lack of controls we excluded one session of Com2. Results for Com and NoCom do not
change when excluding controls and/or including the excluded session. Results in Column 4 do not
change when including this session either. Moreover, the results are robust to OLS regressions.
20We elicited risk preferences through subjects’ self-assessment on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating
that a subject has a very weak willingness to take risks, while a score of 10 means that a subject has
a strong willingness to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that this general risk question is a good
predictor of actual risk-taking behavior.
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(p=0.000) than if he sends another message or does not communicate.21 However, the
coefficient of the interaction dummy Promise*Rev is far away from being significant
(p=0.561), indicating that the probability to choose Roll when having sent a promise is
not further increased by revelation. Moreover, Rev does neither have a general significant
effect in Com (p=0.846) nor in NoCom (p=0.157). As shown by the non-parametric test,
if anything, revelation without communication even leads to less cooperative behavior as
the coefficient of Rev in Column 2 is negative and the p-value is not far from being
marginally significant.
In column 3 we report the results of the probit regression including both treatments. The
reference category is a subject in [NoCom|NoRev]. In order to account for the different
number of promises in the two conditions, we separate the subjects in Com into promisers
and non-promisers and include a dummy for each group. Thus, NoPromise only takes
the value 1 for Bs not promising in Com and it is 0 for subjects in NoCom. Altogether,
we have 6 categories, with [NoCom|NoRev] being the base case including dummies for
all other cases. Similar to Com, we observe that Bs sending a promise have a higher
probability to choose Roll (p=0.000). The coefficients of Rev and and NoPromise*Rev
are not significant, showing that revelation does not change behavior when no promise has
been sent. The coefficient of Promise*Rev is positive, but not significant (p=0.158). Still,
it becomes marginally significant (p=0.085) when excluding the two control variables.22
It seems that Rev marginally increases the probability of choosing Roll conditional on
sending a promise, yet, the effect is very small and not robust. Thus, we are not able to
prove our main hypothesis.
3.2 The Effect of Communication on Cooperation
One major reason for our effects being only marginally significant might be that in
[NoCom|NoRev] already 81% of all Bs sending a promise stick to it, restricting the
scope for further increase in promise keeping with revelation.
We started off with conducting treatment Com1, where Bs choose between a promise,
a statement of intent, and an empty message, and observe a very high promise keeping
rate even without revelation. In order to achieve more promise breaking in the baseline
without revelation, we conducted a second communication treatment, Com2, allowing
Bs to choose only between the same promise and two empty messages. Thereby, Bs
attempting to influence As while planning to take the non-cooperative decision are forced
to break a promise.23 However, this change in the set of messages failed to generate a
21However, the causality is not clear. B might send a promise as he knows he will choose Roll, or he
might choose Roll due to the promise sent. We will address this point in Subsection 3.2.
22Results for column 1 and 2 do not change when excluding risk and female.
23As are only informed that there are three messages to choose from, but that they are unaware of the
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higher rate of promise breaking in the baseline, such that we are not able to confirm
our main hypothesis in Com2 either.24 Yet, the comparison of Com1 and Com2 reveals
some interesting findings about the the effect of communication on cooperation and the
differences between promises and intentions, which we will address in this section.
Bs’ Behavior and the Choice of Messages
Considering Bs’ behavior, it turns out that the set of messages available to B highly
influences the effectiveness of communication on cooperation. In the following analysis,
we pool the data of Rev and NoRev, as there is no significant difference in Bs’ behavior
between both conditions.
Result 6. While the share of Bs choosing Roll in Com2 is significantly higher than in
NoCom, the share in Com1 is not.
We conclude that the possibility to send an intention in Com1 constrains the effectiveness
of communication on cooperation. Figure 4 illustrates the shares of Bs choosing Roll in
all 3 treatments.
Figure 4: Roll Rates of Bs Separated by Treatment
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In Com2 67% of Bs choose Roll, which is significantly higher than the share of 45% in
NoCom (Z= 2.502, p=0.006), and than the share of 48% in Com1 (Z=2.270, p=0.012).
In contrast, Bs in Com1 are as likely to cooperate as Bs in NoCom (Z=0.330, p=0.371).
type of messages or the wording. This was complete information.
24Note that the unchanged communication behavior of Bs allows us to pool Com1 and Com2 to Com
in the analysis of Section 3.1.
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In order to identify the driving forces behind these effects, we analyze the data separated
by types of messages. Table 5 reports the shares of Bs sending each of the three types of
message separately and the corresponding shares of Bs choosing Roll.
Table 5: Overview of Messages Sent and Subsequent Behavior
Messages sent
Promise Intention Empty Total
Com1 34/71 (48%) 19/71 (27%) 18/71 (25%) 71 (100%)
Com2 51/72 (71%) – 21/72 (29%) 72 (100%)
Shares choosing Roll
Promise Intention Empty Total
Com1 26/34 (77%) 5/19 (26%) 3/18 (17%) 34/71 (48%)
Com2 45/51 (88%) – 3/21 (14%) 48/72 (67%)
The sample consists of all B-Persons in Com1 and Com2.
Result 7. The share of Bs sending a promise is significantly higher in Com2 than in
Com1, where roughly one quarter of Bs choose to send an intention. While the majority
of promises is kept, the majority of intentions is broken.
While 71% of Bs send a promise in Com2, only 48% do so in Com1, with the difference
being highly significant (Z=2.794, p=0.003). In Com1 26% of Bs send an intention,
which is not possible in Com2. In both treatments the majority of promises are kept,
in Com1 77%, in Com2 even 88%. In contrast, only 26% of Bs sending an intention
stick to it. This share is significantly smaller than the share of Bs keeping their promise
(Com1 : Z=3.554, p=0.000; Com: Z=5.083, p=0.000), but not significantly different from
the share of cooperating Bs conditional on sending an empty message (Com1 : Z=0.713,
p=0.238; Com: Z=0.997, p=0.160).
Note that the share of promises being kept in Com2 (88%) is even marginally significantly
higher than in Com1 (77%) (Z=1.433, p=0.076), although more Bs send a promise in
Com2 than in Com1. This observation, together with the fact that most intentions are
broken, yields the following result.
Result 8. Not sticking to an intention seems to be less costly than breaking a promise.25
Result 8 can be caused by the diction of the message itself or by the comparison to message
alternatives, indicating that breaking an intention is not the strongest lie. However, such
25This result does not follow from the mere observation that promises are kept and intentions are
broken in Com1 as this might be caused by selection into messages (altruistic subjects send a promise
and selfish subjects send an intention). However, the fact that a higher share of promises is sent and
kept in Com2 than in Com1 yields the result.
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a difference in behavior when sending a promise compared to sending an intention does
not seem to occur in CD (2006), who use free-form messages. Therefore, we suggest that
the latter reason is more likely to explain the observed phenomenon. Subjects who send
an intention might not think “I am indicating to my partner that I will choose Roll”,
but more likely “I did not promise anything”. Thus, unused alternatives seem to play
a role, not as a signal to others, but as a self-justification device to behave selfish.26 To
conclude, the set of messages available to subjects in an experimental setting seems to
play a crucial role for their behavior.
Finally, the fact that Roll rates after sending an intention are not significantly different
from Roll rates after sending an empty message, but are significantly different from Roll
rates after sending a promise in Com1 speaks against the relevance of guilt aversion in
our setting. B knows that A is not aware of the different available messages. Therefore, he
should anticipate that both, a promise and an intention message, increase A’s first-order
belief in comparison to receiving an empty message. Guilt aversion would predict a more
cooperative behavior upon sending an intention than upon sending an empty message,
and a similar behavior upon sending a promise or an intention.27 In turn, promise keeping
per se, as suggested by Vanberg (2008), is likely to play a role in our experiment, given
that a high share of Bs stick to a given promise even if their action choice is not observable.
As’ Behavior
As As do not know which messages can be sent by Bs, we pool Com1 and Com2 to Com
for the analysis of As’ behavior. We do not differentiate between conditions either, as As
do neither know about the existence of two conditions nor does the experimental design
vary across conditions from A’s point of view.
Table 6 gives an overview of As’ behavior in Com and in NoCom. For Com we report
the overall behavior (total) and separated by the message received.
Result 9. The share of As choosing In is increased by communication for all kinds of
messages. Furthermore, As are equally more likely to cooperate after receiving a promise
or an intention than after receiving an empty message.
We observe a large effect of communication on As’ behavior. The share of As choosing
In increases significantly from only 35% in NoCom to 71% in Com (Z=4.833, p=0.000).
This effect is driven by both promises and intentions. After receiving a promise, 79%
of As choose In, and after receiving an intention 74% do so (Z=0.488, p=0.313). These
26It would be interesting to test whether the share of people sticking to an intention, if the only options
are an intention or two empty messages, is similar to the share keeping their promise in Com2.
27We cannot directly test for a difference in second-order beliefs as we ask for averages. We can
only compare second-order beliefs across Com1 and Com2. These are not significantly different (MWU,
2-sided, p=0.995).
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Table 6: A’s Behavior
NoCom
Com
Total Promise Intention Empty
In 21 / 35% 102 / 71% 67 / 79% 14 / 74% 21 / 54%
Out 39 / 65% 41 / 29% 18 / 21% 5 / 26% 18 / 46%
60 / 100% 143 / 100% 85 / 100% 19 / 100% 39 / 100%
The sample consists of all As.
two shares are (marginally) significantly higher than the share of As choosing In after
receiving an empty message, which amounts to 54% (empty vs. intention: Z=1.450,
p=0.074; empty vs. promise: Z=2.845 p=0.002).
Interestingly, the share of As choosing In after receiving an empty message is significantly
different from the respective share in NoCom (54% vs. 35%, Z=1.854, p=0.032). It seems
as if As receiving an empty message might not have considered the possibility of a promise
or an intention, and react to a friendly, though meaningless message.
The difference in As’ behavior across treatments is reflected by their first-order beliefs
about Bs’ behavior. While without communication As believe that on average 45% of Bs
choose Roll, this belief amounts to 58% with communication (MWU, 2-sided, p=0.001).28
Hence, similar to CD (2006), we observe that communication increases As’ first-order
beliefs, thus enhances trust among As.
Does Communication Enhance Mutual Cooperation?
We observe a significant increase of mutual cooperation in Com compared to NoCom,
represented by the share of pairs choosing (In, Roll) in each treatment (45% vs. 13%,
Z=4.270, p=0.000). These shares, reported by type of message sent, are stated in Table 7.
Table 7: Shares of Pairs Choosing (In, Roll)
NoCom Com
Total Promise Intention Empty
8/60 64/143 57/85 3/19 4/39
13.3% 44.8% 67.1% 15.8% 10.3%
Result 10. Communication increases mutual cooperation. However, while promises in-
crease the share of pairs choosing (In, Roll), intentions do not.
28In particular, the average first-order belief is 63%, conditional on receiving a promise, 57% conditional
on receiving an intention and 47% conditional on receiving an empty message. The first order belief is
significantly higher after receiving a promise than after receiving an empty message (MWU, 2-sided,
p=0.001), however not significantly higher than after receiving an intention (MWU, 2-sided, p=0.179).
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While promises lead to a very high cooperation rate, intentions do not. This difference is
mainly driven by the fact that Bs keep their promises, but break their intentions, while
As trust both.29 We conclude that the set of messages available to B plays a crucial role
for the effectiveness of communication in experimental settings.
4 Comparison to Previous Research
The present experimental design is based on the work by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), who analyze the effect of free-form communication on cooperation. While their
design informs A only about her payoffs, we vary the revelation of B’s action choice in order
to test for social image concerns. However, if we restrict our data to the NoRev condition,
we find largely different results. In this section, we therefore analyze these discrepancies
to the work by Charness and Dufwenberg,30 incorporating their follow-up treatment with
predefined messages (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2008 and 2010; henceforth CD, 2010).
In CD (2010), Bs could choose between sending a sheet saying “I promise to choose Roll.”
or an empty sheet, which is closest to our Com2 treatment without revelation. Apart
from the communication protocol, our design differs from CD (2006) and CD (2010) only
in B’s relative payoff for choosing Don’t Roll, which we slightly increased in order to
reduce Roll rates without communication (see Section 3.2).31
Considering Bs’ Roll rates, we do not find any difference between NoCom (53%) and Com
(51%) in the NoRev condition (Z=0.179, p=0.429). Though slightly more Bs cooperate
if we restrict the sample to Com2 (61%), there is still no significant difference to NoCom
(Z=0.637, p=0.262).32 Similarly, communication fails to significantly influence Bs’ behav-
ior in CD (2010) either. While in their experiment the average Roll rate increases from
44% without communication to 58% allowing for predefined messages, this difference is
only marginally significant on a one-tailed test (Z=1.339, p=0.090).33
In contrast, Bs in CD (2006) are significantly more likely to choose Roll after free-form
communication than without communication (44% vs. 67%, Z=2.083, p=0.019). At
first glance, this indicates that Bs feel more committed to a free-form promise than to
a predefined one, yielding an increase in Roll rates in CD (2006). However, while in
29This might have been different, if As had been aware of the messages available to B (compare Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2010).
30More precisely, we only use the (5,5) treatment for comparison as it reflects our payoff structure.
31Furthermore, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006 and 2010) conduct a pen-and-pencil experiment in
the classroom while we use the laboratory and computer screens. However, as we can not identify any
idiosyncratic effect of this design feature, we neglect it in the following analysis.
32Note that the difference was significant pooling Rev and NoRev (Section 3.2), but we restrict the
sample to NoRev here.
33Results considering the whole sample in the communication treatment are only reported in CD
(2008).
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CD (2006), 57% of Bs send a promise in the communication treatment, we only observe
51% in Com and 39% in Com1, the latter difference being almost marginally significant on
a two-tailed test (Com: 51% vs. 57%, Z=0.594, p=0.552; Com1 : 39% vs. 57%, Z=1.608,
p=0.108, two-tailed tests).34 Hence, the higher promise rate in CD (2006) might also
account for part of the increased effect on cooperation.
It is striking that, though CD (2010) find that 85% of all Bs send a promise, which differs
statistically from our promise rate in Com2 (64%, Z=2.293, p=0.022, two-tailed test),
their effect of communication on cooperation is only marginally significant. Compared
to our result, it seems that promises in CD (2010) induce less commitment among Bs.
Indeed, while in Com2 87% of all Bs who send a promise keep it, this share is significantly
lower in CD (2010) (61%, Z=2.183, p=0.029, two-tailed test).35 This might be due to
the fact that the messages available to Bs are common knowledge in their design, while
we leave As unaware of message choices, yielding many Bs to send a promise just in order
to avoid the mistrusting signal of an empty sheet.
As to As’ behavior, we do not find any evidence that predefined messages in our design
dampen cooperation compared to free-form communication. In fact, In rates among
As in our experiment achieve similar levels as in CD (2006) with free-form messages
(71% in Com vs. 74% in CD (2006), Z=0.341). Furthermore, as cooperation among
As is relatively low without communication in our setting (33%),36 we observe a highly
significant effect of communication on As’ behavior (71% in Com, Z=3.520, p=0.000),
exceeding the effect with free-form messages in CD (2006) (56% without communication
vs. 74% with communication, Z=1.777, p=0.038). In contrast, predefined messages in
CD (2010) do not induce As to choose In more often, if at all, In rates decrease (56%
without communication vs. 52% with communication, Z=0.336).37
While this finding seems to be unintuitive at first sight, it shows that besides differenti-
ating between free-form and predefined messages, subtle design differences can account
for huge changes in the credibility of messages. First, while Bs in our experiment choose
an empty message if no promise is made (and can not refuse to send a message), the
only alternative to a promise in CD (2010) is an empty sheet. It might thus be the
case that empty talk in our experiment, though through predefined messages, contains
some general pleasantry, thus inducing As to cooperate more often in the present setting
compared to CD (2010). Second, the explicit announcement in CD (2010) that promises
are not binding might create a social norm reducing both self- and social image concerns
34Though in CD (2006), also intentions were classified as promises, we exclude intentions in Com1 from
the comparison. This is reasonable as Bs in our experiment break intentions more often than promises,
and behave similarly after sending an intention as after sending an empty message (see Section 3.2).
35In contrast, the promise keeping rate in Com (81%) is similar to the one in CD (2006) (75%, Z=0.567,
p=0.571, two-tailed test).
36Note that we restrict the sample to NoRev only.
37There is no effect despite the higher promise rate in CD (2010).
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for non-cooperation among Bs, which in turn might be anticipated by As. Finally, As in
our experiment are not aware of the kind of possible messages, while the exact wording
and procedure is common knowledge in CD (2010). As an empty message thus signals
uncooperative behavior by B in their setting and might induce As to opt out of the game,
it is likely that some Bs in CD (2010) send a promise who would not have done so in
other circumstances. If As anticipate this cheap-talk nature of promises, the credibility
of a promise is reduced, which is why As seem to trust less in CD (2010) than in our
setting. The fact that communication has a larger influence on Bs in our setting than
with free-form messages in CD (2006) can only be explained by the strong wording of
our predefined promise, as compared to the diverse statements of intent in CD (2006).
To summarize, Bs in our experiment as well as in CD (2010) do not seem to be influ-
enced by communication, while in CD (2006), free-form messages increase Roll rates.
In contrast, In rates in our setting highly increase with communication, with this effect
being even stronger than in CD (2006), while messages do not influence As’ behavior in
CD (2010). Hence, starting from a slightly lower cooperation level without communica-
tion than CD (2006), we obtain a similar effect of communication on (In, Roll) rates,
which is also highly significant (13% in NoCom vs. 40% in Com, 50% in Com2, p<0.01 in
both cases, two-tailed test). In general, while messages are most influential when they are
free-form, predefined messages have a larger impact in our experiment than in CD (2010).
This might be due to very subtle changes in the communication protocol, such as A’s un-
awareness of message wording or the possibility of empty talk. We conclude that the
effect of communication is not robust to slight changes in the experimental design.
5 Conclusion
Non-binding communication is at the heart of many economic interactions, especially if
cooperation cannot be contractually enforced, for example because writing fully contin-
gent contracts is impossible or too costly, or because cooperation is not verifiable. Hence,
we contribute to the literature exploring why and in which environments “cheap talk”
can be influential in two-player trust games.
In this paper we experimentally analyze whether individuals stick to their promised ac-
tion, in contrast to the rational prediction, due to the aversion of being perceived as a
promise breaker. While we observe slightly more cooperation of the promising party if
the receiver of the promise can observe its compliance, the results are not significant. We
find that 81% of subjects stick to their promise, even if their action is not observable to
their interaction partners.38 On the one hand, this result limits the scope for a further
38This even exceeds the shares reported in CD (2006) and Vanberg (2008).
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increase in cooperation with revelation. On the other hand, it highlights subjects’ prefer-
ence for promise keeping per se (Vanberg, 2008), which in our experiment seems to play
a more important role than social image concerns.
We find that the preference for sticking to one’s word does only exist for promises and not
for statements of intent. While most of the promises are kept, statements of intent tend to
be broken. In line with this result, we find that the set of available predefined messages
yields different results regarding cooperation by the communicating party, the second
mover. While the possibility to communicate increases cooperation by second movers if
they can only choose between sending a promise or an empty message, communication
has no effect on second movers’ behavior if they have the additional option of sending
a statement of intent. However, the receivers of messages trust both a promise and a
statement of intent in the same way. This finding allows us to exclude guilt aversion as
an explanation for promise keeping, as the communicating party seems to be aware that
a statement of intent does influence his partner the same way as a promise, but still does
not stick to it.
To the best of our knowledge, our study belongs to one of the first economic studies an-
alyzing the combined effect of communication and social image concerns on cooperation,
suggesting a high potential and the need for further research. While we fail to prove the
existence of social image concerns in our anonymous experimental set-up, one should not
transfer this finding to other settings. We rather want to point out the crucial role of the
design of the experiment, when trying to identify such subtle behavioral patterns. Lifting
anonymity (see e.g. Tadelis, 2011) might increase the relevance of social image concerns,
just like repeating the game and allowing for reputation building.
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Appendix
Separated Results for Com1 and Com2
In all three tables the Z Stat. reflects the test of proportions (see Glasnapp and Poggio,
1985). The p-value is on one-tailed tests.
Table 8: Bs’ Average Roll Rate by Treatment and Condition
Treatment Z Stat.
Com1 Com2 Com NoCom (p-value)
Condition
Rev
19/35 26/36 45/71 11/30 2.468
54% 72% 63% 37% (0.007)
NoRev
15/36 22/36 37/72 16/30 -0.179
42% 61% 51% 53% (0.429)
Z Stat. 1.062 1.000 1.450 -1.292
(p-value) (0.144) (0.159) (0.074) (0.098)
The statistics in the last column test for the difference between Com and NoCom.
Table 9: Overview of Messages Sent
Promise Intention Empty
Com1
Rev
20/35 6/35 9/35
57% 17% 26%
NoRev
14/36 13/36 9/36
39% 36% 25%
Z stat. 1.540 -1.805 0.069
(p-value) (0.062) (0.036) (0.472)
Com2
Rev
28/36 – 8/36
78% – 22%
NoRev
23/36 – 13/36
64% – 36%
Z stat. 1.296 – 1.296
(p-value) (0.097) – (0.097)
Com
Rev
48/71 6/71 17/71
68% 9% 24%
NoRev
37/72 13/72 22/72
51% 18% 31%
Z stat. 1.975 -1.692 0.888
(p-value) (0.024) (0.045) (0.187)
29
Table 10: Roll Rates by Type of Message Sent
Promise Intention Empty
Com1
Rev
16/20 1/6 2/9
80% 17% 22%
NoRev
10/14 4/13 1/9
71% 31% 11%
Z stat. 0.580 -0.650 0.633
(p-value) (0.281) (0.258) (0.264)
Com2
Rev
25/28 – 1/8
89% – 13%
NoRev
20/23 – 2/13
87% – 15%
Z stat. 0.257 – -0.183
(p-value) (0.400) – (0.427)
Com
Rev
41/48 1/6 3/17
85% 17% 18%
NoRev
30/37 4/13 3/22
81% 31% 14%
Z stat. 0.534 -0.650 0.344
(p-value) (0.270) (0.258) (0.365)
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General Instructions39
We welcome you to this experiment. Please read these instructions carefully and follow
the instructions on your screen after the start of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment you will get paid according to your decisions and the de-
cisions of the other participants, as described below. In addition, you will get a fixed
payment of 4 Euro for your attendance.
During the whole experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants, to use
mobile phones, or to start other programs on your computer. If you disobey these rules,
we have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your seat to answer your
questions.
During the experiment, we are not talking about euros but about points. Your payment
will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your overall score will be
converted to Euro, where
1 Point = 25 euro cents.
The experiment consists of two parts and a questionnaire. Part 1 will be explained below.
Once all participants have finished Part 1, you will get the instructions for Part 2. A
questionnaire follows after Part 2.
Instructions Part 1
At the start of the experiment, either role A or role B will be assigned randomly to each
participant. You will be informed on your screen which role was assigned to you. One
person A and one person B, respectively, form an interaction pair. The allocation is ran-
dom and anonymous. No participant will get to know the identity of his partner during
or after the experiment. Your payment in Part 1 depends on the decisions made within
your interaction pair.
Decisions:
Each person A chooses between IN and OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B get 10 points
each. If person A chooses IN, the payments depend on B’s decision. Every person B
chooses between ROLL THE DIE and DON’T ROLL THE DIE. At the time of decision,
Person B doesn’t know whether A has chosen IN or OUT. But as B’s decision is only
relevant if A chose IN, every person B should make her decision under the assumption
that A has chosen IN.
39Original instructions were in German and are available upon request. Passages occurring only in the
communication treatments are indicated by [. . . ].
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If A chose IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL THE DIE, B gets 30 points and A 0 points.
If A chose IN and B chooses ROLL THE DIE, B gets 20 points and rolls a die at the end
of the experiment in order to determine A’s payoff. If the die shows 1, A gets 0 points,
if the die shows 2,3,4,5 or 6, A gets 24 points.
The following table summarizes the payments, depending on the decisions made within
an interaction pair and the result of rolling the die.
Decisions Payoff A Payoff B
A chooses OUT 10 10
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL THE DIE 0 30
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL THE DIE, Die=1 0 20
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL THE DIE, Die=2,3,4,5,6 24 20
Please note: Every participant with role B, regardless if she chose ROLL THE DIE or
DON’T ROLL THE DIE, will roll a die at the end of the experiment, such that the role
of the die won’t reveal the decision made by B. The result of rolling the die however is
only relevant for those interaction pairs, where A chose IN and B chose ROLL THE DIE.
[Message:
Before A and B make their decision, B has the opportunity to choose one of three prede-
fined messages and send it to A.]
Bonus questions:
During the experiment every participant has the opportunity to earn extra points by
answering bonus questions correctly. The earnings out of these bonus questions will be
displayed separately at the end of the experiment. You will get more detailed information
during the experiment.
Control questions:
Before the start of the experiment control questions will appear on your screen to check
that you understood the instructions. When all participants have answered these ques-
tions correctly, Part 1 of the experiment starts.
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